




INTEGRATING STATE, REGIONAL, AND 
FEDERAL GREENHOUSE GAS MARKETS: 
OPTIONS AND TRADEOFFS 
JONAS MONAST† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Experiments with limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
through cap-and-trade programs are underway in approximately half 
of U.S. states. There are currently three regional carbon markets 
under development in the Northeast, the West and the Midwest, and 
ten states recently joined eleven other countries and the European 
Commission to form an international forum to share information and 
experiences with the design and implementation of carbon markets.  
At the same time, the U.S. Congress is considering multiple proposals 
to create a federal cap-and-trade market. 
Companies are beginning to take action to reduce their GHG 
emissions, some voluntarily and some in preparation for 
regional/state markets.  The question arises whether and how a 
federal carbon market should address the state and regional carbon 
markets that are in operation before the federal market is 
implemented.  This topic is distinct from the broader issues of 
defining the appropriate role for the states in a national GHG 
emission reduction strategy or whether a federal law should preempt 
states’ authority to limit GHG emissions within their borders.  The 
discussion in this article regarding preemption is limited to the 
treatment of regional/state markets and does not address preemption 
generally. 
This article describes regional/state carbon market initiatives 
currently under development, identifies alternatives for addressing 
these initiatives within a federal GHG emissions cap-and-trade 
system, and highlights political and administrative challenges 
presented by each approach.  To date, only one of the regional cap-
Copyright © 2008 by Jonas Monast. 
 † Jonas Monast, J.D., is co-director of the Climate Change Policy Partnership at Duke 
University.  Special thanks to Drew McConville for his insights and assistance. 
  
330 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 18:329 
ons. 
 
and-trade markets – the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
– is far enough along in its development to provide details with which 
to compare to federal legislative proposals.  As a result, RGGI is 
cited where appropriate, but much of the discussion is framed in 
general terms.  The article also highlights related issues such as 
integrating credits generated through offset projects (i.e. emissions 
reductions or sequestration by uncapped entities such as small 
emitters or the agricultural and forestry sectors) and providing credit 
to companies that have taken early action to reduce GHG emissions. 
II.  REGIONAL/STATE CARBON 
 MARKETS CURRENTLY UNDER DEVELOPMENT 
A growing number of regional/state carbon markets are currently 
under development, each covering different segments of the economy 
and imposing different emissions caps.  Ten states in the Northeast 
and Mid-Atlantic are cooperating in the development of the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) carbon market to cap emissions 
from electric utilities, with emissions trading scheduled to begin in 
2009.1  California has committed to a mandatory cap on emissions 
from sources throughout the state’s economy through 2050,2 and 
regulators are determining which mechanisms the state will use to 
meet the targets.3  In 2007, Hawaii and New Jersey became the 
second and third states to pass legislation mandating greenhouse gas 
limits, committing to reductions through 2020 and 2050, respectively.4  
Like California, these states have not yet announced the mechanisms 
they will use to achieve the reducti
California is also working with six other states and two Canadian 
provinces to develop the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), a 
 1. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://rggi.org/about.htm (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2008). 
 2. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 38500-38599 
(West Supp. 2007)). 
 3. California will release a draft Scoping Plan describing its GHG reduction strategies by 
June 2008.  California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, AB 32 Scoping 
Plan, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scopingplan.htm; see also California Environmental 
Protection Agency, Climate Action Team Proposed Early Actions to Mitigate Climate Change 
in California: Draft for Public Review 3, available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/ 
climate_action_team/reports/2007-04-20_CAT_REPORT.PDF. 
 4. Hawaii Global Warming Solutions Act of 2007, H.B. 226, 2007 Leg., 24th Sess. (Haw. 
2007), signed into law June 30, 2007, available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/ 
sessioncurrent/bills/HB226_CD1_.htm; New Jersey Global Warming Response Act, Assemb. 
3301, 2007 Leg., 212th Sess. (N.J. 2007), signed into law July 6, 2007, available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A3500/3301_R2.HTM. 
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regional market similar to RGGI but with the goal of capping 
emissions from a broader range of sources.5  On November 14, 2007, 
governors from six Midwestern states and the premier of Manitoba 
signed the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord to begin development of 
their own regional carbon market.6  Three additional Midwestern 
states signed onto the Accord as observers.7 
In addition to these formal market efforts, ten states 
participating in the WCI or RGGI recently joined eleven other 
countries and the European Commission in launching the 
International Carbon Action Partnership, “an international forum of 
governments and public authorities that are engaged in the process of 
designing or implementing carbon markets.”8 
III.  PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
At least seven bills capping GHG emissions have been 
introduced in the U.S. Senate this legislative session,9 and at least five 
have been introduced in the House of Representatives.10  The 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, introduced by Senators 
Lieberman and Warner (the Lieberman-Warner bill), passed the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works December 5, 
2005.11  Another bill, introduced by Senators Bingaman and Specter, 
enjoys the support of a powerful array of stakeholders and has 
garnered significant attention and support.12 
These bills do not directly address state markets, although the 
Lieberman-Warner bill does authorize states to enact GHG 
restrictions at least as stringent as those in the federal bill.13  This 
 5. See Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/. 
 6. See Midwestern Governors Association, Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord, 
available at http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf; see also 
Midwestern Governors Association, Governors Sign Energy Security and Climate Stewardship 
Platform and Greenhouse Gas Accord, http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/govenergynov.htm. 
 7. Id. 
 8. International Carbon Action Partnership, Political Declaration (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.icapcarbonaction.com/docs/icap_declaration.pdf. 
 9. E.g., S. 2191, 110th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Environment and Public 
Works, Dec. 5, 2007); S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 309, 110th 
Cong. (2007); S. 317, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1177, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1168, 110th Cong. 
(2007); S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 10. E.g., H.R. 1961, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 4226, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 620, 110th 
Cong. (2007); H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2069, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 11. See S. 2191, 110th Cong. 
 12. See S. 1766, 110th Cong. 
 13. See S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 9004. 
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provision would allow state and regional carbon trading markets to 
continue, provided the required emissions reductions are equal to or 
greater than the federal standard.  Other bills, such as the Bingaman-
Specter bill, are silent regarding preemption of state carbon markets. 
IV.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 
Developing a policy that addresses multiple regional/state carbon 
markets, should a federal cap-and-trade regime come into effect, 
raises a number of issues for policymakers to consider, including: 
• Environmental performance – What level of GHG emissions 
are necessary to prevent catastrophic climate change, what is 
the appropriate timeline for achieving the reductions, and 
what policies will most effectively achieve the reductions? 
• Loss of state revenue – States that are participating in 
regional/state carbon markets may earn income by 
auctioning the allowances to covered entities.  For example, 
RGGI states are relying on a full or close to full auction to 
distribute allowances.14  Is it appropriate for the policy to 
consider losses in state revenue and, if so, what are the 
options for compensating the states? 
• Implementation – How can market integration be designed 
to minimize transaction costs and bureaucratic complexity? 
• Fairness – What safeguards are necessary to avoid windfall 
profits or penalties for companies already participating in 
these markets? 
• Political viability – Is it possible to integrate state, regional, 
and federal carbon markets in a manner that maintains the 
“(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), in accordance with section 116 of the 
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7416) and section 510 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 
U.S.C. 1370), nothing in this Act precludes or abrogates the right of any State to adopt or 
enforce— 
(1) any standard, cap, limitation, or prohibition relating to emissions of greenhouse gas; or 
(2) any requirement relating to control, abatement, or avoidance of emissions of greenhouse 
gas. 
(b) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding subsection (a), no State may adopt a standard, cap, 
limitation, prohibition, or requirement that is less stringent than the applicable standard, cap, 
limitation, prohibition, or requirement under this Act.” 
 14. See, e.g., New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Notice of Pre-
Proposal of New York RGGI Rule: Notice of Release and Call for Comments (Dec. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/26450.html (“Principal among the New York-
specific provisions is the proposed 100% auction allocation method . . . .”). 
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political support of government officials representing the 
affected states? 
• Economic efficiency – How can the policy best maximize 
economic efficiency and create incentives for investment and 
early reductions in GHG emissions? 
V.  OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING  
REGIONAL/STATE CARBON MARKETS IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
From an environmental perspective, the total reduction of GHG 
emissions is the most important criterion of a policy addressing 
climate change.  The method for achieving the reductions – either 
through numerous state/regional trading programs or through a single 
federal program – is insignificant for environmental quality as long as 
the reductions are real and permanent and the programs do not 
simply push GHG emissions to other regions with higher emissions 
caps. 
However, while co-existing state/regional and federal trading 
markets can potentially achieve the same environmental goals as a 
single federal market, a single national market offers additional 
advantages.  From an economic efficiency perspective, a single, 
national market provides covered entities with the broadest range of 
options for complying with a cap on GHG emissions.15  With greater 
flexibility to seek low cost emission reductions and potentially lower 
transaction costs, the overall cost of climate regulation for consumers 
would be reduced.16 Additionally, if federal and state/regional 
markets are to be merged, policymakers must assess how such 
integration can be achieved efficiently and equitably. 
The four general options for addressing regional/state carbon 
markets in federal legislation are evaluated below based on these 
various policy considerations.  The options include: 
1. Allowing federal and regional/state markets to coexist; 
2. Preempting regional/state markets with no effort at 
integration; 
3. Allocating additional federal allowances to states with 
carbon markets and permitting those states to manage the 
integration; or 
 15. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate 
Change 8 (John F. Kennedy School of Government – Harvard Univ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 07-052, 2007). 
 16. Id. 
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4. Accepting banked regional/state allowances in the federal 
trading system. 
As described below, the latter two options – integrating regional/state 
markets, with the integration managed either by the states or by the 
federal government – present more practical options from both a 
political and an economic perspective.  Implementing either of these 
options would be complex, however, and the complexity increases the 
risk that stakeholders could manipulate the system.  Should federal 
policymakers choose either of these routes, it would be prudent to 
consider the factors, described in subsections 3 and 4 below, in order 
to design a market that is fair, transparent, and politically viable. 
1. Allowing federal and regional/state markets to coexist 
There is precedent for federal environmental laws setting a 
baseline and allowing states to enact more stringent protections.  
Both the Clean Air Act17 and the Clean Water Act18 allow states to 
enact laws or regulations that exceed pollution limits established by 
the federal government.  As mentioned above, the Lieberman-
Warner bill currently follows this model,19 potentially allowing 
regional/state GHG markets to coexist with the federal market 
created by the bill.  Allowing states to continue taking the lead in 
curbing GHG emissions through multiple state-based markets may be 
attractive politically and could lead to environmental benefits if the 
states target emissions that are outside the federal cap.20  It is more 
likely, however, that this approach would have a significant economic 
impact and would result little or no cumulative environmental 
benefits.  First, large GHG emitters located within states that 
participate in regional cap-and-trade markets would have an incentive 
to relocate to states without the additional emissions limitations, 
resulting in “leakage” of GHG emissions from one geographic region 
to another.21  Where leakage does not occur because large GHG 
emitters remain within the state/regional market systems, the more 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2005). 
 18. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2005). 
 19. See S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 9004. 
 20. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 110TH CONG., CLIMATE 
CHANGE LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR DIFFERENT OF 
GOVERNMENT (Comm. Print 2008) (hereinafter House Energy and Commerce Committee 
White Paper), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Climate_Change/white%20paper 
%20st-lcl%20roles%20final%202-22.pdf. 
 21. Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for 
Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 60 (2007). 
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stringent emission limitations would mean those companies would 
require fewer federal allowances.22  As a result, more federal 
allowances would be available to other covered entities across the 
nation and the nation’s overall GHG emissions would remain 
unchanged despite the more stringent state programs. 
Depending on how regional/state markets treat federal 
allowances and vice versa, participating in two overlapping markets 
simultaneously could require covered entities to pay twice for 
emitting the same ton of carbon without providing additional options 
for reducing the emissions.  Furthermore, regional/state markets 
could decide not to link with other domestic GHG markets.  Limiting 
trading options in this manner may inflate allowance costs by cutting 
off access to a larger supply of allowances from entities outside the 
geographic area that may otherwise be available. 
Even if regional/state markets adopt the standard currency of the 
federal allowances and simply require their firms to meet a higher 
standard, compliance standards that differ across state boundaries 
reduce overall economic efficiency and create incentives for 
relocation.  Depending on the compliance requirements for the 
regional/state markets, covered entities could face higher transaction 
costs due to multiple accounting and reporting standards.23  Perhaps 
more significantly, a regional/state market that utilizes federal 
allowances would require covered entities with high GHG emissions 
to purchase more allowances than they would otherwise purchase 
under the federal system alone.  Retiring these extra allowances in a 
state/regional market would limit the supply of allowances available 
to other entities covered by the federal cap-and-trade system and 
thereby increase the costs for all market participants. 
Stricter regional/state standards could also distort markets by 
creating arbitrary incentives based on geography, with GHG 
emissions likely shifting from regions with stringent emissions caps to 
those with less stringent or no emissions caps.24  The concept of 
“leakage” – shifting GHG emissions activities from regions subject to 
an emissions cap to regions with no or less stringent restrictions – is a 
significant concern for subfederal GHG cap-and-trade systems.  
RGGI participants, for example, include states that participate in the 
PJM regional electricity transmission organization – a system with 
 22. House Energy and Commerce Committee White Paper, supra note 20, at 11, 15. 
 23. Id. at 13. 
 24. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 21, at 60. 
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“significant coal-fired generation capacity.”25  PJM includes three 
RGGI participants (New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware), a portion 
of Illinois (a signatory to the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord), 
and five additional states that have not entered into a regional 
agreement to regulate GHGs.26  With only a portion of the PJM 
generators located in states that will eventually be subject to GHG 
cap-and-trade systems, emissions within PJM could easily shift to 
generators in states without their own cap-and-trade systems, thereby 
avoiding the higher generation costs.  One organization reports that 
modeling using the IPM power-sector simulation model suggests that 
“leakage could offset 60-90% of RGGI’s emission reductions.”27 
2. Preempting regional/state markets with no effort at 
integration 
Blanket preemption would likely face opposition from state 
political leaders, investors, and perhaps environmentalists.  Political 
leaders in these states have invested time, resources, and political 
capital to forge carbon market agreements, and may see a blanket 
preemption of the regional/state markets as penalizing them for their 
leadership in addressing climate change. 
At the same time, companies participating in regional/state 
carbon markets before a federal cap-and-trade market enters into 
effect will make investments to reduce their GHG emissions.  Many 
could accumulate banked allowances by the time the federal 
government implements a carbon market, and would almost certainly 
oppose a federal system that simply preempts regional/state markets 
and renders those banked allowances worthless.  Also, the potential 
for futures markets to develop in these regional programs could result 
in an additional pool of investors with monetary interests in the 
regional/state allowances. 
Preempting regional/state climate initiatives without provisions 
to integrate the markets could result in a number of problematic 
outcomes, including: a depression in the value of state-issued carbon 
 25. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Potential Emissions Leakage and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): Evaluating Market Dynamics, Monitoring Options, and 
Possible Mitigation Mechanisms ES-1, ES-2 (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/ 
docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf. 
 26. See PJM, Overview, http://www.pjm.com/about/overview.html (last visited Mar. 24, 
2008). 
 27. American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, The Magnificent Seven: States 
Take the Lead on Global Warming, ACEEE’S Grapevine Online, Jan. 17, 2006, 
http://www.aceee.org/about/0601rggi.htm. 
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allowances as the start date of the federal program approaches; 
higher costs for meeting the emissions requirements caused by stifled 
trading in the final years of the regional/state market; and the 
dumping of allowances on the market by investors seeking to recover 
some of their costs.  The European Union’s experience with the 
transition from Phase I to Phase II of its Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS)28 is instructive.  The EU ETS did not allow companies to 
transfer banked allowances from Phase I to the current Phase II, 
contributing to a dramatic drop in price in the last few months of 
Phase I.29  Preempting state programs without ensuring that banked 
regional/state allowances retain value could similarly discourage early 
emissions reductions and market investments in state/regional 
programs. 
3. Allocating federal allowances to states with carbon markets 
and permitting those states to manage the integration 
The first option for integrating regional/state carbon markets 
into a federal market relies on the states to manage the integration 
process.  The current version of the Lieberman-Warner bill provides 
separate pools of allowances to states for various reasons.  For 
example, the bill sets aside two percent of each year’s allowances for 
distribution to states that, prior to implementation of the federal 
system, enacted GHG emission reduction programs that exceed the 
federal standard.30  Similarly, one percent of the annual allowances 
would be distributed among states that adopt specific energy-saving 
policies.31  Another five percent of the annual emission allowances 
would be allocated to states to fund a variety of policy objectives, 
including mitigating the impacts on low-income energy consumers 
and/or vulnerable industries, promoting energy efficiency, and 
encouraging technology development.32  Following this precedent, the 
 28. Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC). 
 29. LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME (ETS) ENTERS KYOTO COMPLIANCE PHASE 26 (2008), 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Dec/RL34150.pdf (“The combination of poor 
emissions inventories, non-use of project credits, and time-limited allowances with effectively no 
banking resulted in extreme price volatility in Spring 2006, and virtually worthless allowances by 
mid-2007.”). 
 30. S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 3401 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Env’t and Pub. Works, 
Dec. 5, 2007). 
 31. Id. at § 3402. 
 32. Id. at § 3303.  The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee adopted an 
amendment by Senator John Barasso that allows states to use their portion of this five percent 
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federal climate bill could provide an additional category of 
allowances to states with carbon trading markets in the final stages of 
development or already in existence by either; (a) the time of 
enactment of a federal climate bill (e.g. RGGI) or (b) the time the 
federal program comes online (e.g. California). 
This approach sets a single national cap on GHG emissions while 
also providing the eligible states with the flexibility to determine 
whether and how to reimburse covered entities for their unused 
regional/state-issued allowances.  For example, states could permit 
companies to exchange their unused regional/state allowances for 
federal allowances of equal value or could sell the federal allowances 
in the marketplace and offer to buy unused regional/state allowances.  
This approach also allows states earning income by auctioning 
regional/state allowances to sell a portion of the federal allowances on 
the market to replace the lost auction revenue.  Finally, permitting 
states to manage the integration of their markets with a federal 
market could provide a solution to the question of how to address 
banked offset credits generated through regional/state markets, an 
issue that, as discussed in Section VI below, could prove difficult if 
managed on the federal level. 
The approach is not without tradeoffs.  At least 23 states have 
pledged to develop and participate in RGGI, WCI, or the Midwest 
Greenhouse Gas Accord,33 and the number of states that would be 
eligible for compensation continues to grow as new markets are 
proposed (e.g. the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord announced on 
November 15, 200734) and new states sign onto existing carbon market 
initiatives (e.g. Montana announcing on November 19, 2007 that it 
would join the WCI35).  RGGI is scheduled to begin allowance 
trading in 2009, and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord states that 
signatories will “develop a market-based and multi-sector cap-and-
of allowances to fund any other purpose necessary to mitigate negative economic impacts of 
global warming or the Act.  Id. at § 3303(1)(L). 
 33. E.g., Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship Summit, Midwestern 
Greenhouse Gas Accord, Midwestern Governors Ass’n (2007), 
http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf; Midwestern Governors 
Ass’n, Governors Sign Energy Security and Climate Stewardship Platform and Greenhouse Gas 
Accord., http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/govenergynov.htm; Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, http://rggi.org/about.htm. 
 34. Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship Summit, supra note 33. 
 35. Montana announced on November 19, 2007 that it would become the seventh U.S. 
state to join the WCI. Sarah Elliott, Governor Announces New 20X10 Initiative – State to Lead 
by Example, Accepts Climate Change Report and Joins Western Climate Initiative, Montana’s 
Official State Website, Nov. 19, 2007, http://governor.mt.gov/news/pr.asp?ID=513. 
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trade mechanism within 30 months” (by May 15, 2010).36  WCI has 
yet to announce its implementation date, but it is possible that all 
three regional carbon markets could come on-line by the time a 
federal policy would likely be effe
States participating in these markets would have an incentive to 
begin trading prior to the implementation date for the federal policy 
to justify their claim on a portion of the additional allowances.  If the 
portion of federal allowances allocated to states for this purpose is 
conditioned on the number of banked regional/state allowances that 
exist prior to the federal program’s implementation, there could be a 
strong push by states working on the WCI or the Midwest 
Greenhouse Accord to design their systems in a manner that would 
generate a higher number of allowances than would otherwise exist.  
Other states that are not participating in GHG market development 
would also have an incentive to create their own markets quickly to 
ensure that they get a portion of the additional allowances. 
Allocating sufficient emission allowances to each of these states 
could restrict the number of allowances available to fund other 
objectives such as offsetting increased energy costs for low-income 
citizens, promoting carbon capture and storage technologies, 
investing in international forest protection, revenue recycling to offset 
other discretionary taxes, etc.38  Furthermore, a decentralized 
approach may create advantages for firms in particular states.  For 
example, New York and Connecticut could decide on different 
approaches to compensating utilities covered by RGGI, creating a 
potential advantage for companies in one of the states. 
To address the concern that there may not be enough federal 
allowances to compensate firms for banked regional/state allowances, 
federal policymakers could limit allocations to the states based on the 
actual number of allowances that are banked when the federal market 
becomes effective.  If policymakers determine that the number of 
allowances should also be sufficient to reimburse states for some or 
 36. Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship Summit, supra note 33. 
 37. For example, the Lieberman-Warner bill would become effective in 2012.  S. 2191, 
110th Cong. § 1201(a) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Env’t and Pub. Works, Dec. 5, 2007). 
 38. See, e.g., id at § 3401, 3403(b)(1) (allocating allowances to load-serving entities to 
“mitigate the economic impacts on low- and middle-income energy consumers, including by 
reducing transmission charges or issuing rebates” and to promote energy efficiency); id. at § 
3601 (allocating four percent of annual allowances for years 2012-2030 to promote development 
of carbon capture and storage technologies); id. at § 3801-3806 (allocating “2.5 percent of 
allowances for use in carrying out forest carbon activities in countries other than the United 
States.”). 
  
340 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 18:329 
 
all of the lost income from allowance auctions, the number of 
allowances could be increased accordingly.  The allowances given to 
the states for this purpose could also be rationed over a number of 
years if the number of required allowances is too high to allocate in 
one year, eventually achieving a one-to-one ratio between the banked 
state allowances and the allocated federal allowances. 
4. Accepting regional/state allowances in the federal trading 
system 
A second option for integrating regional/state carbon markets 
would preempt state markets when the federal market becomes 
effective, yet allow entities with banked regional/state carbon 
allowances to use them in the federal market.  Under RGGI and the 
Lieberman-Warner bill, covered entities can comply with their 
emissions caps by reducing their own emissions, purchasing 
allowances from other companies subject to the emissions cap, or 
purchasing offset credits from entities that are not subject to the 
emissions cap.39  Assuming that allowances for direct emissions in all 
of the affected markets represent the equivalent of a ton of carbon 
dioxide,40 reductions in carbon emissions under any program are 
equivalent to reductions under any other program, even if total 
emission reductions and price per ton may vary.41 
This approach maintains administrative simplicity on the federal 
level and maintains stable regional/state markets until the federal 
program begins.  In addition, certainty that banked regional/state 
allowances would retain value in the federal system could provide an 
incentive for companies to invest in early emission reductions.  While 
accepting regional/state allowances into the federal system could lead 
 39. RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule, Jan. 5, 2007, XX-7, XX-10, 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf; see also, S. 2191, 110th Cong. §§ 
1202, 2101. 
 40. The RGGI market will use the measurement of short tons, while proposals for federal 
legislation and the EU Emission Trading System use metric tons.  Should policymakers choose 
this option, it may be necessary to translate RGGI credits to metric ton equivalents.  One metric 
ton is equal to 1,000 kilograms, or 2,204.6 pounds, whereas the U.S. measurement of a short ton 
equals 2,000 pounds, http://www.metric-conversions.org/weight/short-tons-to-metric-tons.htm. 
 41. For example, RGGI allowance prices are projected to reach about $3.00/ton in 2015, 
while credits based on a proposal outlined by Senators Lieberman and Warner in August, 2007, 
were projected to reach $18 in the same year.  New York Dept. of Envt’l. Conservation, Job 
Impact Statement 6 NYCRR Part 242, CO2 Budget Trading Program, available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/39140.html; Brian C. Murray & Martin T. Ross, The 
Lieberman-Warner America’s Climate Security Act: A Preliminary Assessment of Potential 
Economic Impacts, Oct. 2007, at 5, Duke University and RTI International, available at 
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/econsummary.pdf. 
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to extra allowances in the first years of the federal market, it should 
not lead to a net increase in atmospheric GHG concentrations if all 
state programs are designed well.  Because carbon dioxide released 
today will remain in the atmosphere for approximately a century, a 
ton of carbon dioxide will lead to the same increase in overall 
atmospheric concentrations whether it is released in 2011 under a 
regional cap or in 2012 under a federal cap.42  Accepting 
regional/state allowances would simply allow companies with banked 
allowances to choose between using allowances in the regional/state 
market prior to the federal market, or after the federal marke
e. 
One concern with accepting regional/state allowances in a federal 
market is that any major failures of state/regional programs could be 
carried over to a federal program.  For example, a recent analysis by 
Point Carbon suggests that the RGGI emissions cap may exceed 
actual emissions through 2012, “allowing for the build-up of a 
significant emissions bank.”43  The report projects that the bank of 
over-allocated allowances “would not be depleted until the cap begins 
to decrease in 2015.”44  Over-allocation could be a particular concern, 
as accepting regional/state allowances into a federal market could 
create perverse incentives for states to over-allocate credits, 
particularly those taki
ederal program. 
If an over-allocated regional/state cap were not resolved before 
implementation of a federal market (i.e. a regional/state program 
does not result in total reductions greater than the emissions 
represented by banked allowances), then the companies holding 
banked allowances would have the advantage of continuing to emit 
the same level of GHGs while also saving low-cost emissions 
allowances for use in the federal market.  This would result in both a 
fairness issue and more GHG emissio
e regional/state and federal caps. 
The differing regional/state caps raise a similar concern – 
companies operating in markets with less stringent caps could enjoy a 
competitive advantage over those subject to more stringent caps.  For 
 42. Lydia Olander et al., Climate Change Science: What We Know, Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. 
Policy Solutions, Duke University, Mar. 2007, at 2, available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/ 
institute/climatchangesummary.pdf. 
 43. Press Release, Point Carbon Research, Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Is RGGI Over-
Allocated?, (Aug. 17, 2007), 10-11 (on file with author). 
 44. Id. 
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 emissions, could delay investments aimed at 
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nce as half of a federal allowance, or another 
appropriate number). 
example, Company A, operating in a region with a less stringent cap, 
and Company B, operating in a region with a more stringent cap, 
could make equal reductions in their GHG emissions.  Whereas the 
reductions may be enough for Company B to comply with the 
region’s emissions cap, Company A’s emissions reductions could lead 
to a large number of banked allowances because fewer allowances are 
required to comply with the less stringent cap.  The ability to use 
banked allowances in a federal cap-and-trade system could lead to 
pressure on state lawmakers to enact less stringent emissions caps in 
order to provide a lon
r their jurisdiction. 
Additionally, accepting regional/state allowances could suppress 
the initial value of federal emission allowances if a significant number 
of regional/state allowances were available due to over-allocated 
regional/state programs or greater reductions in GHG emissions than 
expected.  Depending on a stakeholder’s interests, suppressed prices 
in the federal market could be seen as a positive or a negative – 
companies may face less of a financial burden as they adjust to a 
carbon market, yet a higher number of available allowances, and thus 
a higher cap on GHG
sions reductions. 
If any of the concerns described above become points of 
contention, either from an environmental or economic perspective, 
policymakers could grant to the EPA Administrator the authority to 
discount the value of a state-generated allowance (i.e., counting a 
state-generated allowa
VI.  CREDITS GENERATED THROUGH OFFSET PROJECTS 
Early emissions reductions achieved through offset projects 
present additional challenges for integrating federal and 
state/regional GHG markets.  In order to represent a valid, long-term 
reduction in GHG emissions, mechanisms must be in place to 
measure and verify the offset projects.  Regulators designing a federal 
offsets program must determine the types of projects that are eligible 
for participation in the program, as well the mechanisms for verifying 
that: (a) the offsets represent additional reductions in GHG emissions 
rather than reductions that would have occurred without the offset 
program; (b) the projects do not create “leakage” – shifting the 
emissions from one emitter to another rather than achieving a 
reduction in overall emissions; and (c) there are adequate safeguards 
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to account for eventual release or reversal – a particular concern 
when offset projects depend on storing GHGs in plants or soils.45  
Federal regulators could face significant challenges with verifying 
numerous regional/state of
verification measures. 
Additionally, while the allowances available in a cap-and-trade 
system are limited by the cap placed on total GHG emissions, banked 
offset credits (credits purchased from entities not covered by the 
GHG emission cap and banked for future use) have to qualify as 
offsets under the legislation but are not ultimately limited in 
number.46  Although RGGI analysts predict low demand for offset 
projects in the first three years of the market – only 0.6 million short 
tons out of a total emissions cap of 188 million short tons47 – the 
supply of credits in the private, voluntary GHG markets is large and 
growing.  In just five years, the Chicago Climate Exchange has issued 
credits for over 20 million metric tons (or nearly 23 million short 
tons).48  Participants in regional/state GHG markets may be more 
likely to tap into this already booming offset market if banked offsets 
were transferable to an emerging federal market.  Regulators 
determining how to address banked offset credits in regional/state 
markets could decide to subject all banked offset credits – from 
regional/state markets and voluntary markets – to the
 45. Climate Change Policy Partnership, Harnessing Farms and Forests: Domestic 
Greenhouse Gas Offsets for a Federal Cap and Trade Policy FAQs, Duke University Ctr. on 
Global Change, http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/ccpp/harnessingfaqs.pdf. 
 46. Legislation may limit the total number offset credits that a covered entity may use to 
comply with its emissions cap.  For example, the Lieberman-Warner Bill allows capped entities 
to “satisfy up to fifteen percent of the total allowance submission requirement . . . by submitting 
offset allowances.”.  S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 2402(a).  If GHG markets allow unrestricted 
banking of offset credits, however, the total number of offset credits available for purchase 
would be limited by the scope of projects that qualify under the definition of an offset and the 
number of offset providers selling the credits rather than the amount of GHG emissions that 
could be sequestered in trees and soil and/or achieved through companies that are not subject to 
a federal emissions.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for example, estimates that 
the total GHG mitigation potential from the domestic forest and agriculture sectors alone could 
be as high as 655 terragrams (or 655 million metric tons) of carbon dioxide per year by 2025.  
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION POTENTIAL IN 
U.S. FORESTRY AND AGRICULTURE ES-2 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
sequestration/pdf/ghg_part2.pdf. 
 47. RGGI, Evaluation of Offsets Supply and Potential Demand, May 1, 2006, 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/offsets_supply_5_1_06.pdf. 
 48. Chicago Climate Exchange, CCX Registry Offsets Report, December 13, 
2007,http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/offsets/projectReport.jsf. 
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Given the difficulties of verifying actual reductions49 and the 
potential for offset credits to flood the market in its early years, 
federal regulators could choose to exclude banked offset credits from 
the federal market.  If policymakers adopted options V(3) or V(4) 
described above, the impacts of excluding banked offsets on the state 
and regional markets would be limited by the fact that covered 
entities could use credits from offsets to meet their obligations in the 
regional/state markets and bank any remaining regular allowances for 
use in the federal market. 
On the other hand, a decision to accept banked offset credits in 
the federal system could lead to increased investment in 
regional/state-based offset projects and early emissions reductions 
from unregulated entities, generating income for and support from 
landowners, farmers, and small emitters, and allowing federal 
regulators to evaluate the effectiveness of offset projects while 
creating the federal rules for offset projects.  If policymakers choose 
to integrate banked offset credits into the federal GHG market, they 
will need to establish clear standards that a state and regional offset 
verification program must meet.  While the EPA could define the 
federal offsets protocol, federal legislation could place the burden on 
state/regional regulators or the owners of the banked offset credits to 
provide independent verification of compliance with the federal 
criteria. 
A federal cap-and-trade system could accept verified, banked 
offset credits using an approach similar to those described above – 
allocating allowances to states and permitting the states to distribute 
the federal allowances to owners of banked offset credits or allowing 
the owner of banked offset credits to use the credits directly in the 
federal market.  Federal legislation could address concerns about a 
large number of offset credits flooding the market by allowing 
regulators to discount the credits or limit the number of offset credits 
that may enter the market in any given year. 
 49. Regulators will need to verify that an offsets project (a) results in an overall reduction 
in GHG emissions (i.e., a tree plantation that would exist with or without a cap-and-trade 
market would not lead to additional reductions), (b) avoids leakage, and (c) accounts for the 
risk of release or reversal (e.g., a hurricane blowing trees down).  Olander, supra note 42, at 4; 
see generally, Michael Gillenwater, et al., Policing the Voluntary Carbon Market, Nature, Oct. 
11, 2007, http://www.nature.com/climate/2007/0711/full/climate.2007.58.html. 
  
Spring 2008] INTEGRATING GREENHOUSE GAS MARKETS 345 
08.51 
 
VII.  CREDIT FOR EARLY ACTION 
Both the Lieberman-Warner bill and RGGI provide allowances 
for companies that take action to reduce their GHG emissions prior 
to implementation of the markets.  The Lieberman-Warner bill, for 
example, provides allowances during the first five years of the federal 
market to reward firms for verified emissions reductions from 1994 
until the implementation of the federal market.50  Similarly, the 
RGGI Model Rule establishes a utility’s emissions baseline using 
emissions data from 2003-2005, and creates “early reduction CO2 
allowances” for utilities whose emissions are lower than their baseline 
level between 2006 and 20
The different dates for determining baselines and the different 
methodologies for verifying early emission reductions create the 
distinct possibility that early actors could receive multiple allowances 
for the same emission reduction.52  If a company received allowances 
for early action from regional/state markets and those markets were 
integrated into the federal system, it would not be equitable to 
provide an equal number of allowances for early action at both 
regulatory levels.  Companies operating in states without mandatory 
GHG cap-and-trade systems could find themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage.  On the other hand, state and federal regulators may 
not provide the same level of credit for early actions, suggesting that a 
blanket approach that excludes companies from receiving federal 
credit if they have also received state-based credit could result in 
inadequate compensation compared to companies in unregulated 
states. 
A federal law could avoid both of these inequitable results by 
granting regulators the flexibility to adjust allocation to individual 
early actors, with the goal of treating early actors equally.  If the 
regional/state market has already provided some credit, the federal 
regulators could provide additional allowances as necessary to ensure 
that those companies receive the same level of credit as those 
companies operating in unregulated states.  On the other hand, 
regulators could withhold allowances from companies receiving the 
 50. S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 3301. 
 51. RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule, January 5, 2007, XX-5.3(c), 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf. 
 52. WCI and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord have not specified how they will 
address early actors. 
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same level of early action credit in the regional/state market as they 
would have under the federal market. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
At least one of the three regional/state carbon markets currently 
under development – RGGI – is scheduled to go into effect well 
before the Lieberman-Warner or Bingaman-Specter bills’ effective 
date of 2012,53 and another – the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord – 
will at least be developed if not fully implemented.54  There is reason 
to believe that the third, WCI, will also be in effect by 2012, as that is 
the deadline by which California law requires that state to begin 
achieving emissions reductions.55  A federal climate policy will need 
to specify whether these markets can continue operating after a 
national climate regime is in place, and what, if anything, will happen 
to unused regional/state emissions allowances.  A plan to integrate 
the regional markets presents a compromise between outright 
preemption and subjecting companies to the inefficiencies of 
multiple, overlapping cap-and-trade programs.  With proper 
forethought, policymakers could design a federal market that creates 
a level playing field, rewards states for taking the lead, rewards 
companies who have taken early action, and, at the same time, does 
not put companies operating in states without carbon markets at a 
disadvantage. 
 53. S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 1201(a). 
 54. Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship Summit, Midwestern Greenhouse 
Gas Accord, Midwestern Governors Ass’n 4 (2007), http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/ 
resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf. 
 55. Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., § 38562. 
